A friend/colleague emailed me the other day to ask my opinion about the Law of the Sea Treaty. My response:
"I haven't been following it very closely, but I know the general
details. To be honest, I'm not sure I understand what the fuss is about.
My thinking on this and related topics was turned around by teaching
the Rome Treaty and the ICC this past semester: if you look at the text
of the Treaty, and the powers that are granted to the Prosecutor, they
really are as broad and unlimited as American commentary against the
Treaty would suggest: the Prosecutor has nearly unlimited power to do
what he wants and can continue to investigate as long as he wants--no
one can definitively and finally stop him. But that level of power is
necessary because without it, it'd be impossible to get even a minimal
level of compliance. The Thomas Lubanga case is a good example: the
Prosecutor had to threaten to use his proprio motu power to start his
own investigation unless the DRC agreed to help him out, and this was to
get the DRC to agree to get rid of someone they didn't want to have to
deal with themselves. And the Prosecutor wasn't going to get very far
without the DRC's help, proprio motu powers or not. So in general, the
practical limitations of politics do a lot of work and have to be
figured into an analysis of the law itself, and we shouldn't rely only
on the worst case scenario.
I think the LotS treaty is similar: I understand the concern about
submitting disputes to arbitration, but 1. there are already widespread
and accepted international arbitration boards for private economic
questions, which mostly proceed without incident (Chris Whytock, who you
may remember, has done a lot of work on these) and 2. if the relevant
difference between public and private arbitration is the role that
politics plays in the public version (and I'd assume this to be the
relevant difference) politics is mostly going to play itself out in ways
that make the arbitration process more conservative and small-scale,
rather than larger or bolder. China, for example, is not going to accept
or seek a ruling that weakens the U.S. now but might hurt it in the
future. And there is also, always, the possibility of simply ignoring
results we don't like, as has been known to happen with the ICJ..."
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