"I can easily apprehend that, the more considerable a Thing is which runs the Risk of perishing, the more Equity requires that the Words of the Law be restrained, to authorise the Care of preserving such a Thing. But I dare not condemn indifferently all private Persons, or a small Part of the People, who finding themselves reduced to the last extremity, have made use of the only Remedy left them, in such a Manner as they have not neglected in the mean Time to take care, as far as they were able, of the publick Good."
There's some interesting and complicated jurisprudence going on here and elsewhere in Grotius--and the question of how law ought to affect political action. The words of the law have to be interpreted with other background considerations, which may trump a strict interpretation. But elsewhere he suggests that exceptions don't qualify as exceptions to a general rule (e.g. I.4.IV). The quick move would say Grotius simply contradicts himself, but if I've learned anything in my Grotius study, it's that if it appears to be a contradiction, you're not reading carefully enough.
It's a bit afield from my current project, but I think it's be interesting to try and situate Grotius in the later 17th century's debate between common law and positivist legal approaches in England (and elsewhere). Coke, Hale, Grotius and Hobbes (and lots of others, too, but as Tuck establishes, Grotius is important for a lot of intellectual trends in England at that time) are all attempting the same general task, and one that's never really been resolved to satisfaction. And trying to bring some clarity to the understanding of international law would also be helpful, as the continuing debate over humanitarian intervention shows.
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