WELL*: Prof. Munger, below, in the comments:
"I don't see that this claim is INHERENT to rational choice theory, though of course it is generally true as an empirical matter.
But, in my 1994 book, IDEOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF POLITICAL CHOICE, i claimed that (1) the moral point of view is actually more important than self-interest, and that (2) people do often sacrifice their "interest" to do what is right. May I recommend in particular the discussion of lifeboats and foxholes in chapter 11?"
A large part of my undergraduate education was a confirmation of both of the points he makes, and I certainly didn't mean to imply all rational choicers think this way (I mostly dropped in 'rat choicers' in because I think it's one of the more amusing nicknames one side has given the other, possibly the best since 'menshiveks'). Part of what we're doing is arguing at cross-purposes, since I have my suspicions that domestic political choices by individual actors are really all that rational (four years at Michigan will lead you to that conclusion). Nevertheless, Prof. Munger is right--rational choice theory is strictly agnostic on the question of whether or not actions have inherent moralities atttached to them. But by the fact that people who do rational choice theory are frequently concerned with only the empirical realities of how people make decisions, I think there is, other things constant, a tendency to be deflationist about morality, and that's troubling for me as a political theorist.
I'll make a point of picking the book up tomorrow (pending availability), so there may well be more thoughts were this one came from.
*I should also point out, as has been pointed out to me many times, that there were actually a fair number of people who opposed the reading of Hobbes I was arguing against. I think I probably focused a bit more on the points I felt the need to argue against, which probably happens frequently.
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