2.6.04

LINK: I'll have to dig out my symbolic logic notes, but I'm pretty sure Will Baude is wrong here:

"That's why I've limited my argument here to showing that the two beliefs are perfectly consistent. To do that, my task is to destroy any potential inconsistency, because that's what it is for two beliefs to be philosophically consistent with one another."

And I say it's wrong because it's setting the standard way, way too low: beliefs can be logically consistent but not otherwise (meaningfully) consistent, so, for example, one can believe both that snow is black and that loud sounds are loud. They pass Will's test--they are perfectly consistent, but one of them is false, and neither of them have anything to do with one another. Demonstrating your beliefs (especially your moral beliefs, which presumably are grounded in something) are consistent isn't accomplishing very much, argumentatively.

See also Sara Butler and DFMoore.

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