Anti-Climacus

FUN STUFF: This will end up on my Political Philosophy class' website, in theory for discussion. But y'all get a crack at it first:

Like most of you, I’ve been following the debate on whether or not to go to war with Iraq. Most of the debate, when it puts itself in moral terms, deals with Just War theory—a war can be legitimate if there is a real enough threat, if the response is proportional, etc etc. I have seen a number of articles that use this doctrine to justify going to war or not going to war. But it seems to me that framing the debate in this sense misses something larger.

By virtue of being Americans, we have special obligations in the realm of political action. Specifically, we have a vision of what it is that we have governments for in the first place, and how we can judge the legitimacy of any regime in power (I consider Jefferson to have spoken conclusively on these matters in the Declaration of Independence). The catch is that in our case (whether there exist other countries that frame their political obligations in the same way is another question entirely, though I suppose that there are), we have, in the fundamental character of our nation, obligations that are universalizable. It is not simply the case that our government gains legitimacy inasmuch as it protects the political rights of the people through mechanisms they consent to—that is the requirement for legitimacy in any government.

There is an additional layer of complexity, though, when it comes to implementation. Two demands compete: first, the claim of political liberty is so primary that it demands action NOW; but circumstances do not permit action to be equally efficacious in all situations. With this in mind, I would like to propose that there needs to be a theory running concurrent with Just War theory, which recognizes that when the following four conditions obtain, we have a moral obligation to go to war and foster the growth of a republican-democratic government:

1. The existence of a (relatively) pluralistic, secular society
2. The existence of a collection of individuals or groups prepared to take leadership of the democratic-republican government
3. Reason to believe other courses of action will not produce a desirable result (i.e., a change a government)
4. Reason to believe that any military action taken would proceed (relatively) quickly

I don’t claim that the language employed in these four points is impeccable, but only that they represent in reasonably short form the broader principles at play. But it is reasonable to ask why these four conditions are the ones to look to when judging whether to go to war.

The first condition is needed because no republican-democratic government can exist for very long without a civil society. Obviously, one will not spring into being overnight, or perhaps even for a fair amount of time, so making the actual existence of a civil society a prerequisite would be too restrictive. But a pluralistic, secular society will ensure that some of the necessary pieces for civil society are already in place.

An already-existing group of leaders committed to republican-democratic ideals is also a prerequisite, because any form of military provisional government or puppet regime installed into power is completely unacceptable. This sort of leadership class cannot exist without desire for representative government and the leadership skills that are necessary to lead. Again, it is difficult to say how things will work in the long term, but the presence of local leaders provides a relatively good security net against the short-term threats to governmental stability.

Underlying the third and fourth conditions are a recognition that we simply cannot go to war with every regime that is undesirable, though for two different sets of reasons. The third is meant to recognize that diplomatic horse-trading has a role, and that some dictators (as much as this goes against the principle of liberty) are not as bad as others. Pakistan strikes me as the perfect example here: Musharraf is exactly the sort of leader who is amenable to U.S. pressure—in other words, will stay in line when we need him to stay in line, which makes him less of a direct threat. But he also strikes me—through the reading I’ve done on the subject—as the sort of figure who would be prepared to introduce civil and political reforms to his country, which would set the stage for a change of governmental forms not requiring a war. Odious though he may be from the position of liberty, he is a figure we can deal with.

The fourth condition is meant to rule out the obviously militarily bad scenarios, which come in two flavors. The first would be one like the Sudan, where military objectives would be hard to formulate, so achieving success would be hard to quantify—exactly the sort of Vietnam-esque quagmire we want to avoid. There are also the Chinas of the world (North Korea might be a better example), where it is arguable that we could prevail, but the losses incurred would be—by order of magnitude—beyond an acceptable range.

Obviously, this theory didn’t develop in a vacuum. It is an outgrowth of the argumentation I’ve done on the Iraq issue, and I think of Iraq as being a case in which all four of the conditions hold. I’m primarily interested, then, in hearing responses to two particular questions: how does this argument hold up with regard to Iraq (I’m prepared to outline my case for that if requested)? But moreover, how does this function as a moral argument in its own right—does meeting the four conditions necessarily constitute a moral trigger for war?