Anti-Climacus

TO DAVID, AGAIN: Sadly, you miss the point. Even granting you that it is possible to replicate any particular experience via the physio-chemical structures of the brain (and rather than just take your word for it, I'd love to see a paper or book that demonstrates that this is the case), this does not explain away the experience of having that sensation. There are philosophical theories available that speculate as to how this is done (Idenitity theory, for one, and Dennett's Quining approach to phenomenology), but that requires slightly more sophisticated argumentation than just saying that the phenomenal content of experience is the particular brain states that go along with the experience. Is it not possible, to pick one argument for a rich mental life, that some physical process x merely correlates to the experience of a sensation, rather than causing that sensation? We can bring out Hume on induction if you're unconvinced that this may possibly be the case.