QUOTE FOR THE EVENING: Amidst my other projects, I've been trying to work my way through Lost (I won't quite caught up by the first new episode, but I think I'll be there by the second). Anyway, from Television Without Pity:
"You know, if a guy like Michael, whose preferred form of jungle traversal is yelling and crashing through the bush, can sneak up on the Tailaways like this, it is no wonder that the Others have been kicking their asses since the crash."
"Thou shalt not extinguish thine anger, but shall master it,
that thy conscience may not be blunted by adjustment
to wrong causes."
-The Dutch Ten Commandments to Foil the Nazis
31.1.07
WHAT? There was something else here?
Is that a David Bowie video I'm linking to? Bowie's pretty cool, isn't he?
Is that a David Bowie video I'm linking to? Bowie's pretty cool, isn't he?
30.1.07
QUOTE FOR THE EVENING:
"The Mother Superior opened the parlor door, but as she was going out she hesitated. Once more she gave Kitty a long, searching, and sagacious look. Then she laid her hand gently on her arm.
'You know, my dear child, that one cannot find peace in work or in pleasure, in the world or in a convent, but only in one's soul.'
Kitty gave a little start, but the Mother Superior passed swiftly out."
-W. Somerset Maugham, The Painted Veil
"The Mother Superior opened the parlor door, but as she was going out she hesitated. Once more she gave Kitty a long, searching, and sagacious look. Then she laid her hand gently on her arm.
'You know, my dear child, that one cannot find peace in work or in pleasure, in the world or in a convent, but only in one's soul.'
Kitty gave a little start, but the Mother Superior passed swiftly out."
-W. Somerset Maugham, The Painted Veil
QUOTE: From Free Exchange:
"CEOs who support higher minimum wages are not, as the media often casts them, renegade heros speaking truth to power because their inner moral voice bids them be silent no more. They are by and large, like Mr Sinegal, the heads of companies that pay well above the minimum wage. Forcing up the labour costs of their competitors, while simultaneously collecting good PR for "daring" to support a higher minimum, is a terrific business move. But it is not altruistic, nor does it make him a "maverick". Costco's biggest competitor, Wal-Mart, also supports a higher minimum wage, and for the same reason. Wal-Mart's average wage is already above the new minimum; it will cost the company little, while possibly forcing mom-and-pop stores that compete with Wal-Mart out of business. This seems blindingly obvious to me. Though I don't expect we'll see "the minimum wage—it's great for Wal-Mart!" in many Democratic campaign commercials."
"CEOs who support higher minimum wages are not, as the media often casts them, renegade heros speaking truth to power because their inner moral voice bids them be silent no more. They are by and large, like Mr Sinegal, the heads of companies that pay well above the minimum wage. Forcing up the labour costs of their competitors, while simultaneously collecting good PR for "daring" to support a higher minimum, is a terrific business move. But it is not altruistic, nor does it make him a "maverick". Costco's biggest competitor, Wal-Mart, also supports a higher minimum wage, and for the same reason. Wal-Mart's average wage is already above the new minimum; it will cost the company little, while possibly forcing mom-and-pop stores that compete with Wal-Mart out of business. This seems blindingly obvious to me. Though I don't expect we'll see "the minimum wage—it's great for Wal-Mart!" in many Democratic campaign commercials."
LINK: Oddly, I've been to the gas station that exploded today multiple times on my way to and from Pennsylvania. It's one of the many nice little towns off the highway in southern West Virginia; I feel sad for them.
ON RELATIVE NORMATIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A few things from my response paper that I happened to like:
[The concept of obligations erga omnes*] can be understood in two ways: either it is intended to create a narrow right of standing, so that any state can hold a state violating its obligations legally accountable. But if the stress of the linguistic construction is placed on obligation, it raises the possibility of universal, exceptionless norms such as we have been discussing. If true, then it gives actors the ability to think not so much of their obligations towards others, but the obligations others have towards them—hence obligations erga ipsum**. Do the conditions of jus cogens*** allow states (or other participants in the system) to think primarily in terms of what is owed to them rather than the role they ought to play in the international system...?
...
To put the question another way: suppose a obligation erga omnes is recognized or established, but I as a state actor do not want to support it, not because I disagree with the moral aim or its need to be some kind of legal principle, but I believe a more narrowly tailored norm will meet with more compliance more readily, leaving the possibility of strengthening the norm in the future (it may be useful in this context to think about how early 20th-century Hague conferences laid the groundwork for more comprehensive international law governing war). Would it be possible under jus cogens to take such a position, or would the strong obligation be imposed on me anyway?
*toward all
**toward itself
***i.e., the creation of universal, exceptionless norms (this is my reading, probably slightly prejudicial)
[The concept of obligations erga omnes*] can be understood in two ways: either it is intended to create a narrow right of standing, so that any state can hold a state violating its obligations legally accountable. But if the stress of the linguistic construction is placed on obligation, it raises the possibility of universal, exceptionless norms such as we have been discussing. If true, then it gives actors the ability to think not so much of their obligations towards others, but the obligations others have towards them—hence obligations erga ipsum**. Do the conditions of jus cogens*** allow states (or other participants in the system) to think primarily in terms of what is owed to them rather than the role they ought to play in the international system...?
...
To put the question another way: suppose a obligation erga omnes is recognized or established, but I as a state actor do not want to support it, not because I disagree with the moral aim or its need to be some kind of legal principle, but I believe a more narrowly tailored norm will meet with more compliance more readily, leaving the possibility of strengthening the norm in the future (it may be useful in this context to think about how early 20th-century Hague conferences laid the groundwork for more comprehensive international law governing war). Would it be possible under jus cogens to take such a position, or would the strong obligation be imposed on me anyway?
*toward all
**toward itself
***i.e., the creation of universal, exceptionless norms (this is my reading, probably slightly prejudicial)
29.1.07
QUOTE FOR THE EVENING: I had a conversation this evening that reminded me of this, from Robert Nozick's The Examined Life:
"A Portrait of the Philosopher as a Young Man
When I was fifteen years old or sixteen I carried around in the streets of Brooklyn a paperback copy of Plato's Republic, front cover facing outward. I had read only some of it and understood less, but I was excited by it and knew it was something wonderful. How much I wanted an older person to notice me carrying it and be impressed, to pat me on the shoulder and say... I didn't know what exactly.
I sometimes wonder, not without uneasiness, what that young man of fifteen or sixteen would think of what he has grown up to do. I would like to think that with this book he would be pleased.
It now occurs to me to wonder also whether that older person whose recognition and love he sought then might not turn out to be the person he would grow up to become. If we reach adulthood by becoming the parent of our parents, and we reach maturity by finding a fit substitute for parents' love, then by becoming our ideal parent ourselves finally the circle is closed and we reach completeness."
Also, unrelatedly, another video for a song by Oasis that I happen to love.
"A Portrait of the Philosopher as a Young Man
When I was fifteen years old or sixteen I carried around in the streets of Brooklyn a paperback copy of Plato's Republic, front cover facing outward. I had read only some of it and understood less, but I was excited by it and knew it was something wonderful. How much I wanted an older person to notice me carrying it and be impressed, to pat me on the shoulder and say... I didn't know what exactly.
I sometimes wonder, not without uneasiness, what that young man of fifteen or sixteen would think of what he has grown up to do. I would like to think that with this book he would be pleased.
It now occurs to me to wonder also whether that older person whose recognition and love he sought then might not turn out to be the person he would grow up to become. If we reach adulthood by becoming the parent of our parents, and we reach maturity by finding a fit substitute for parents' love, then by becoming our ideal parent ourselves finally the circle is closed and we reach completeness."
Also, unrelatedly, another video for a song by Oasis that I happen to love.
28.1.07
27.1.07
YOUR SATURDAY EVENING POST: (Hey, I didn't even do that on purpose):
The Libertines ("Can't Stand Me Now")
One of my favorite Oasis b-sides "Listen Up"
The always impressive PJ Harvey: "Big Exit" (from a live performance on Later... with Jools Holland)
The Libertines ("Can't Stand Me Now")
One of my favorite Oasis b-sides "Listen Up"
The always impressive PJ Harvey: "Big Exit" (from a live performance on Later... with Jools Holland)
DIVESTMENT: SOME PRACTICAL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS:
There was an interesting article in the paper today (link here, but I think subscription only) about the push by activists in the US to get mutual funds to divest holdings in the Sudan until the genocide in Darfur stops. What interests me primarily about this issue is that it, again, is one where the predominant ethical viewpoint values more heavily the immediate thing to be done, and not what comes after that. Which is to say, no one (I think) is going to argue that stopping genocide in one way or another is a bad thing, but I'm not sure that a country that doesn't have much in the way of infrastructure or economic development does well if other countries impose more restrictions on growth. Thus:
"Sudan's ambassador to the U.S., Khidir Haroun Ahmed, publicly expressed "deep concern" last year about the divestment campaign, saying it "will impede development [by] hampering foreign investment that is vital to rebuilding the country." The concern is that it could target firms that may in fact be helping the poor of Sudan by providing jobs."
The article makes reference to South Africa as a possible case of the success of divestment. I'm prepared to grant that argument; the Sudan doesn't follow because (just a guess, but I'm fairly confident about it) South Africa had an economy and infrastructure in which foreign divestment could apply political and economic pressure in the right way. My suspicion is that by applying the same method to a different situation will only create more problems. As usual, this is just a hunch, but I wonder how much thinking is ever given to the long-term effects of redirecting financial resources in humanitarian crises.
There was an interesting article in the paper today (link here, but I think subscription only) about the push by activists in the US to get mutual funds to divest holdings in the Sudan until the genocide in Darfur stops. What interests me primarily about this issue is that it, again, is one where the predominant ethical viewpoint values more heavily the immediate thing to be done, and not what comes after that. Which is to say, no one (I think) is going to argue that stopping genocide in one way or another is a bad thing, but I'm not sure that a country that doesn't have much in the way of infrastructure or economic development does well if other countries impose more restrictions on growth. Thus:
"Sudan's ambassador to the U.S., Khidir Haroun Ahmed, publicly expressed "deep concern" last year about the divestment campaign, saying it "will impede development [by] hampering foreign investment that is vital to rebuilding the country." The concern is that it could target firms that may in fact be helping the poor of Sudan by providing jobs."
The article makes reference to South Africa as a possible case of the success of divestment. I'm prepared to grant that argument; the Sudan doesn't follow because (just a guess, but I'm fairly confident about it) South Africa had an economy and infrastructure in which foreign divestment could apply political and economic pressure in the right way. My suspicion is that by applying the same method to a different situation will only create more problems. As usual, this is just a hunch, but I wonder how much thinking is ever given to the long-term effects of redirecting financial resources in humanitarian crises.
LINK: A cartoon version of The Road to Serfdom (via Greg Mankiw, who contributes a little humor of his own)
LINK: Interview in the Wall Street Journal with Garry Kasparov about his attempt to form a coalition to oppose Putin:
""The Other Russia" is the name of the unlikely left-right coalition conceived by Mr. Kasparov in 2005 and founded last year. It is composed of groups that would normally be at political odds--democrats like Mr. Kasparov, nationalists, socialists, even Bolsheviks. Mr. Kasparov predicts that the Communist Party will join up before the end of the year. "There's still a lot of distrust," he says, with more than a modicum of understatement. "It's a problem, but I don't think it's insurmountable. The big advantage of the Other Russia, and I think it's our biggest accomplishment, is that we've established the principle of compromise, which was not yet seen in Russian politics. It was always confrontation. It was a mentality of a civil war. We eliminated it."
A declaration at the time of the Other Russia's organizing conference last summer reads, "We are gathering together because we are united in our disagreement with the current political course of the Kremlin and united in our alarm for the present and future of our country." The group's sole objective is to find a candidate to run--and win--in the March 2008 presidential elections. Or as Mr. Kasparov puts it with characteristic bluntness: "When a liberal democracy is re-established, everybody goes his or her way.""
""The Other Russia" is the name of the unlikely left-right coalition conceived by Mr. Kasparov in 2005 and founded last year. It is composed of groups that would normally be at political odds--democrats like Mr. Kasparov, nationalists, socialists, even Bolsheviks. Mr. Kasparov predicts that the Communist Party will join up before the end of the year. "There's still a lot of distrust," he says, with more than a modicum of understatement. "It's a problem, but I don't think it's insurmountable. The big advantage of the Other Russia, and I think it's our biggest accomplishment, is that we've established the principle of compromise, which was not yet seen in Russian politics. It was always confrontation. It was a mentality of a civil war. We eliminated it."
A declaration at the time of the Other Russia's organizing conference last summer reads, "We are gathering together because we are united in our disagreement with the current political course of the Kremlin and united in our alarm for the present and future of our country." The group's sole objective is to find a candidate to run--and win--in the March 2008 presidential elections. Or as Mr. Kasparov puts it with characteristic bluntness: "When a liberal democracy is re-established, everybody goes his or her way.""
25.1.07
ON WHETHER I HAVE ANY HOPE IN EVER GETTING A JOB: (All of the following said by someone not within two years of worrying about the job market. Caveat lector.)
Chris points to this Jacob Levy post on this report from APSA about the preponderance (or lack) of jobs offered in political theory with respect to those offered in both the other 'traditional' subfields and those that have emerged as of late. Says Chris:
"My sense from four years on the market is that new hiring, particularly outside the research universities, is trending in a very pragmatic direction, with more emphasis on applied and borderline vocational subfields such as policy and public administration (and, to a lesser extent, quantitative political analysis as applied to those fields) and rather less on the theoretical study of politics, normative or otherwise."
I have three thoughts about this:
1. Most people who get into programs in political theory have some awareness of the lack of jobs out there, even if they have no particular idea how bad it may be any particular year. Levy's 20 Questions at Crescat Sententia came out as I was applying to grad programs, and I took what he said to heart: the odds are not good that I'll place in a tenure-track job my first time out on the market. It is likely that I'll have to take some combination of post-docs and one-year positions before I have enough of a publishing history to be taken seriously. On the margins, there are things you can do to make yourself more attractive to schools (and the locally capricious nature of hiring adds a fair amount of noise to the signal), but in large part I think there's some dues-paying involved.
2. My sense from following political theory rumor mill and some of the end-of-year wrap-ups on who got hired, the market's not entirely terrible. If nothing else, I have the story Michael Gillespie told about how many political theory jobs there were when he first went on the market, and it makes 62 look more than decent. Duke, as far as political theory programs go, is up there--maybe not quite high enough to get your foot in the door just on that alone--and has placed fairly well so far this year, given the number of PhDs who are out.
3. My own research agenda runs not just to political theory, but also into international relations, public law (international, in particular), and political philosophy. It runs that way largely because of the phenomena I'm interested in, but it's not entirely lost on me that it could function as a comparative advantage, depending on the sort of jobs I might apply for. Fortunately, that's still a few years away for me.
Chris points to this Jacob Levy post on this report from APSA about the preponderance (or lack) of jobs offered in political theory with respect to those offered in both the other 'traditional' subfields and those that have emerged as of late. Says Chris:
"My sense from four years on the market is that new hiring, particularly outside the research universities, is trending in a very pragmatic direction, with more emphasis on applied and borderline vocational subfields such as policy and public administration (and, to a lesser extent, quantitative political analysis as applied to those fields) and rather less on the theoretical study of politics, normative or otherwise."
I have three thoughts about this:
1. Most people who get into programs in political theory have some awareness of the lack of jobs out there, even if they have no particular idea how bad it may be any particular year. Levy's 20 Questions at Crescat Sententia came out as I was applying to grad programs, and I took what he said to heart: the odds are not good that I'll place in a tenure-track job my first time out on the market. It is likely that I'll have to take some combination of post-docs and one-year positions before I have enough of a publishing history to be taken seriously. On the margins, there are things you can do to make yourself more attractive to schools (and the locally capricious nature of hiring adds a fair amount of noise to the signal), but in large part I think there's some dues-paying involved.
2. My sense from following political theory rumor mill and some of the end-of-year wrap-ups on who got hired, the market's not entirely terrible. If nothing else, I have the story Michael Gillespie told about how many political theory jobs there were when he first went on the market, and it makes 62 look more than decent. Duke, as far as political theory programs go, is up there--maybe not quite high enough to get your foot in the door just on that alone--and has placed fairly well so far this year, given the number of PhDs who are out.
3. My own research agenda runs not just to political theory, but also into international relations, public law (international, in particular), and political philosophy. It runs that way largely because of the phenomena I'm interested in, but it's not entirely lost on me that it could function as a comparative advantage, depending on the sort of jobs I might apply for. Fortunately, that's still a few years away for me.
24.1.07
SO: Blogroll reorganized to remove the moribund blogs; also to reflect what I actually tend to look at now.* There may be some additions and subtractions in the next couple of days, depending on mood (and whether I forgot something).
*and to keep some that other people have told me that they liked. If I accidentally dropped something, let me know.
*and to keep some that other people have told me that they liked. If I accidentally dropped something, let me know.
23.1.07
SO: At today's talk, I was thinking about possible definitions of trust; I have a suspicion that a decent understanding of what's involved in it will be necessary to get some sense of how (e.g.) humanitarian interventions play out beyond the initial moment of intervention, the conditions needed to bring people back into civil and international society. So I submit the following, mostly in the hope that James will tell me if I'm violating ordinary language usage here:
In a two-way relation, trust functions as an exclusionary reason, so that A believes a change in the relative position or interest of B will not fundamentally alter the relationship*, (and vice versa)**.
*or, depending on how much you want to implicate institutions, 'will not lead to a renegotiation of the underlying terms of the relationship'
**my suspicion is that trust can run one way (and in an instance of humanitarian intervention, it may be more important that it run from those in the country being intervened in to those intervening than the opposite), but, for some obvious reasons, works better running both ways
In a two-way relation, trust functions as an exclusionary reason, so that A believes a change in the relative position or interest of B will not fundamentally alter the relationship*, (and vice versa)**.
*or, depending on how much you want to implicate institutions, 'will not lead to a renegotiation of the underlying terms of the relationship'
**my suspicion is that trust can run one way (and in an instance of humanitarian intervention, it may be more important that it run from those in the country being intervened in to those intervening than the opposite), but, for some obvious reasons, works better running both ways
22.1.07
TODAY'S QUESTION: Brought on by too much reading in advance of the philosophy of international law seminar I'm taking: are erga omnes obligations really just legalized Kantian categorical imperatives (in that they are universally applicable and exceptionless), and if so, should that give us a reason to resist the formation of a hierarchy of norms?
19.1.07
18.1.07
OH YEAH: I had forgotten to re-set my alarm from several days ago, which meant that I woke up at just the right time this morning to be able to watch it snow (for the first time in Durham in a couple of years, and the first time I'd seen in it a year or so).
It was, you know, pretty and whatever. I'm ready for spring now.
It was, you know, pretty and whatever. I'm ready for spring now.
16.1.07
LINK: Further proof that YouTube is the greatest thing ever: Gorky's Zygotic Mynci doing Merched Yn Neud Gwallt Eu Gilydd.
15.1.07
LINK: Megan McArdle has an interesting post on the problems of hindsight in attempting to judge past decisions. The particular case here is the Iraq war. Now, my reasons for supporting the war were different than most peoples', so hindsight doesn't really change my judgment of whether invading was morally and politically acceptable. Since then, things have gone, to put it mildly, not so well; but I have an academic hunch that part of this is because the great majority of political and legal writing on intervention focuses on the justification for the immediate decision to intervene (that is, it shouldn't be surprising that no one in the administration had a plan for what to do beyond the immediate military operations: almost no one ever does). Anyway, the good excerpt:
"Many of the doves seem to be reconstructing their memory of why they objected to the war, crediting themselves with having predicted that the invasion would fail in this way. Many hawks are also reconstructing their memories to make themselves less hawkish. Fortunately, or unfortunately for me, I wrote my predictions down, so I know that I was an unabashed hawk, 100% convinced that Saddam had WMD.
The lesson that I can unequivocally take out of this is: do not be so confident in your ability to read other people and situations. Saddam was behaving exactly as I would have behaved if I had WMD, so I concluded that he had them. I will never again be so confident in the future.
At the same time, though, in a similar situation this shouldn't necessarily make me listen to the hawks [I think she means 'doves,' but I'm not sure] next time. North Korea was behaving exactly like a country that had WMD, and it turned out that this was because they had them. What the doves would like to see the hawks do--"I was wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong about everything, I am a stupid idiot, you are a brilliant figure with god-like omniscience"--is no better a guide to future decisionmaking than ignoring the fact that you were seriously wrong about the Iraq invasion. They are both ways of being completely stupid, not that this has stopped anyone."
"Many of the doves seem to be reconstructing their memory of why they objected to the war, crediting themselves with having predicted that the invasion would fail in this way. Many hawks are also reconstructing their memories to make themselves less hawkish. Fortunately, or unfortunately for me, I wrote my predictions down, so I know that I was an unabashed hawk, 100% convinced that Saddam had WMD.
The lesson that I can unequivocally take out of this is: do not be so confident in your ability to read other people and situations. Saddam was behaving exactly as I would have behaved if I had WMD, so I concluded that he had them. I will never again be so confident in the future.
At the same time, though, in a similar situation this shouldn't necessarily make me listen to the hawks [I think she means 'doves,' but I'm not sure] next time. North Korea was behaving exactly like a country that had WMD, and it turned out that this was because they had them. What the doves would like to see the hawks do--"I was wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong about everything, I am a stupid idiot, you are a brilliant figure with god-like omniscience"--is no better a guide to future decisionmaking than ignoring the fact that you were seriously wrong about the Iraq invasion. They are both ways of being completely stupid, not that this has stopped anyone."
LINK: Via Jacob Levy, I discovered this bizarre story about France and the UK in 1956. I'm sure there's a very interesting angle here on the shifting meaning of sovereignty over time. But mostly: weird.
UPDATE: Now that I think about it, the story constitutes a piece of evidence for Krasner's "sovereignty doesn't really mean that much, national interest does" theory. It'd be worthwhile for someone with more energy than me to look into exactly how serious this negotiation was--I can't help but think there's a very interesting IR article that could come out of it, especially (as the article points out) given the future direction of French politics and the traditional narrative of the growth of the EU (though I claim nothing concrete about the last; my exposure to EU and pre-EU politics largely comes through Andrew Moravscik's work, and that only tangentally).
UPDATE: Now that I think about it, the story constitutes a piece of evidence for Krasner's "sovereignty doesn't really mean that much, national interest does" theory. It'd be worthwhile for someone with more energy than me to look into exactly how serious this negotiation was--I can't help but think there's a very interesting IR article that could come out of it, especially (as the article points out) given the future direction of French politics and the traditional narrative of the growth of the EU (though I claim nothing concrete about the last; my exposure to EU and pre-EU politics largely comes through Andrew Moravscik's work, and that only tangentally).
14.1.07
QUOTE:
"I don't consider high pressure sales sales at all: it's a form of fraud. In--in true sales, you're providing a real and constructive service, helping people make their lives more agreeable or their companies more efficient, and in so doing creating wonderful economies of scale from which everyone, and the whole economy, benefit."
-Ted Boynton, Barcelona
"I don't consider high pressure sales sales at all: it's a form of fraud. In--in true sales, you're providing a real and constructive service, helping people make their lives more agreeable or their companies more efficient, and in so doing creating wonderful economies of scale from which everyone, and the whole economy, benefit."
-Ted Boynton, Barcelona
12.1.07
SO: appearances to the contrary, I've not forgotten James' question (in the comments here) on the sources to which we can appeal for not-quite-argument. That answer will come in a little bit, but in the meantime, a little from one of my own favorite 'telling witnesses or advocates', on the uses and limitations of language:
So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years--
Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l'entre deux guerres--
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is wholly a new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling,
Undisciplined sqauds of emotion. And what there is to conquer
By strength and submission, has already been discovered
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope
To emulate--but there is no competition--
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.
So here I am, in the middle way, having had twenty years--
Twenty years largely wasted, the years of l'entre deux guerres--
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt
Is wholly a new start, and a different kind of failure
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in which
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling,
Undisciplined sqauds of emotion. And what there is to conquer
By strength and submission, has already been discovered
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one cannot hope
To emulate--but there is no competition--
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost
And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss.
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.
11.1.07
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